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Abstract
We study the problem of protecting information when learning with graph-structured data. While
the advent of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) has greatly improved node and graph representational
learning in many applications, the neighborhood aggregation paradigm exposes additional vulnera-
bilities to attackers seeking to extract node-level information about sensitive attributes. To counter
this, we propose a minimax game between the desired GNN encoder and the worst-case attacker.
The resulting adversarial training creates a strong defense against inference attacks, while only
suffering a small loss in task performance. We analyze the effectiveness of our framework against
a worst-case adversary, and characterize the trade-off between predictive accuracy and adversarial
defense. Experiments across multiple datasets from recommender systems, knowledge graphs and
quantum chemistry demonstrate that the proposed approach provides a robust defense across various
graph structures and tasks, while producing competitive GNN encoders. Our code is available at
https://github.com/liaopeiyuan/GAL.
1 Introduction
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have brought about performance gains in various tasks involving graph-
structured data [Battaglia et al., 2018, Scarselli et al., 2009]. A typical example includes movie recommen-
dation on social networks [Ying et al., 2018]. Ideally, the recommender system makes a recommendation
not just based on the description of an end user herself, but also those of her close friends in the social
network. By taking the structured information of friendship in social network into consideration, more
accurate prediction is often achieved [Hamilton et al., 2017, Xu et al., 2018]. However, with better utility
comes more vulnerability to adversarial attacks. To gain sensitive information about a specific user in
the network, malicious adversaries could try to infer sensitive information not just only based on the
information of the user of interest, but also information of her friends in the network. Such scenarios are
increasingly ubiquitous with the rapid growth of users in common social network platforms. The above
problem poses the following challenge:
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Figure 1. Graph AdversariaL Networks (GAL). GAL defends node and neighborhood inference attacks via a
min-max game between the task decoder (blue) and a simulated worst-case attacker (yellow) on both the embedding
(descent) and the attributes (ascent). Malicious attackers will have difficulties extracting sensitive attributes at
inference time from GNN embeddings trained with our framework.
How could we protect sensitive information of users in the network from malicious inference
attacks while maintaining the utility of service? Furthermore, can we quantify the trade-off
between these two goals?
In this paper, we provide answers to both questions. We propose a simple yet effective algorithm
to achieve the first goal through adversarial learning of GNNs, a general framework which we term as
Graph AdversariaL Networks (GAL). In a nutshell, the proposed algorithm learns node representations
in a graph by simultaneously preserving rich information about the target task and filtering information
from the representations that is related to the sensitive attribute via a min-max game (Figure 1). While
the saddle point optimization formulation is not new and has been applied broadly [Ben-David et al.,
2010, Goh and Sim, 2010, Goodfellow et al., 2014, Madry et al., 2017], we are the first to formulate the
attribute inference attack problem on graphs, and to demonstrate min-max optimization is effective for
GNNs in these settings, theoretically and empirically.
We provide theoretical guarantees for our algorithm, and quantify the inherent trade-off between GNN
predictive accuracy and adversarial defense. First, we prove a lower bound for the inference error over the
sensitive attribute that any worst-case attacker has to incur under our algorithm. Second, we quantify how
much one has to pay in terms of predictive accuracy for protecting sensitive information from adversarial
attacks. Specifically, we prove that the loss in terms of predictive accuracy is proportional to how the
target task is correlated with the sensitive attribute in input node features.
Empirically, we corroborate our theory and the effectiveness of the proposed framework on 6 graph
benchmark datasets. We show that our framework can both train a competitive GNN encoder and perform
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adequate defense. For instance, our algorithm successfully decreases the AUC of a gender attacker by
10% on the Movielens dataset while only suffering 3% in task performance. Furthermore, our framework
is robust against a new set of attacks we term “neighborhood attacks” or “n-hop attacks”, where attackers
can infer node-level sensitive attributes from embeddings of 1- and n-distant neighbors. We verify that
in these new settings, our algorithm remains effective. Finally, our theoretical bounds on the trade-off
between accuracy and defense agree with experimental results.
In summary, we formulate the attribute inference attack problem on GNNs. In this new setting, we
show that GNNs trained with a min-max game framework GAL achieve both good predictive power and
defense, theoretically (Theorem 3) and empirically (Table 2). Our theory also quantifies the trade-off
between accuracy and privacy (Theorem 1), and is supported by experiments (Figure 3).
2 Preliminaries
Notation We first define several concepts that will be used in throughout the paper. Let D be a
distribution over a sample space X . For an event E ⊆ X , we use D(E) to denote the probability of E
under D. Given a feature transformation function g : X → Z that maps instances from the input space X
to feature space Z , we define g]D := D ◦ g−1 to be the pushforward distribution of D under g, i.e., for
any event E′ ⊆ Z , g]D(E′) := D({x ∈ X | g(x) ∈ E′}).
For two distributions D and D′ over the same sample space Ω, let dTV(D,D′) be the total variation
(TV) distance between them:
dTV(D,D′) := sup
E⊆Ω
|D(E)−D′(E)|.
Clearly, the TV distance is always bounded: 0 ≤ dTV(D,D′) ≤ 1, and in fact it is a distance metric over
the space of probability distributions, hence it satisfies the triangle inequality.
Graph Neural Networks We begin by first introducing the notation and the application settings of
GNNs. Let us denote by G = (V,E) a graph with node features Xv ∈ Rd for v ∈ V and edge
features Xe ∈ Rl for e ∈ E. The training data consists of a set of graphs {G1, ..., GN} ⊆ G and labels
{y1, ..., yN} ⊆ Y . Depending on the task, each yi can either be a set of labels for the corresponding set
of nodes or edges on Gi, or a single label for the entire graph Gi. Our goal is to learn to predict labels for
unseen nodes, edges, or graphs. To this end, we use H to denote the set of hypothesis that takes node
features from GNNs as input and produces a prediction.
Modern GNNs follow a neighborhood aggregation scheme [Gilmer et al., 2017, Xu et al., 2018,
2019b], where we recursively update the representation vector X(k)v of each node v (in layer k), by
aggregating the representations of its neighbors. Node vectorsX(k)v can then be used for node and relation
prediction. Formally, the k-th layer of a GNN is
X(k)v = AGGREGATE
(k)
({(
X(k−1)u , X
(k−1)
v , Xe=(u,v)
)
: u ∈ N (v)
})
, ∀k ∈ [K], (1)
whereX(k)v ∈ Rdk is the feature vector of node v at the k-th iteration and we useK to denote the number
of layers. We initializeX(0)v = Xv, andN (v) is the neighborhood of node v. Many GNNs, with different
aggregation and graph readout functions, have been proposed under this neighborhood aggregation
framework [Defferrard et al., 2016, Du et al., 2019, Duvenaud et al., 2015, Fey, 2019, Hamilton et al.,
2017, Kearnes et al., 2016, Kipf and Welling, 2017, Santoro et al., 2017, Scarselli et al., 2009, Velickovic
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et al., 2018, Xu et al., 2018, 2019b, 2020]. A GNN formula that has shown to provably learn complex
functions on graphs is introduced in Xu et al. [2020]:
X(k)v =
∑
u∈N (v)∪{v}
MLP(k)
(
X(k−1)u , X
(k−1)
v , Xe=(u,v)
)
. (2)
Attribute Inference Attack on GNNs While being a powerful paradigm for learning node and graph
representations for downstream tasks [Xu et al., 2019b, 2020], GNNs also expose huge vulnerability to
potential malicious attackers whose goal is to infer sensitive attributes of individual nodes from the learned
representations. This is of particular importance nowadays due to various kinds of publicly available
structured data being used and explored in real-world scenarios, e.g., social networks, recommender
systems, and knowledge graphs [Gong and Liu, 2016, 2018]. To this end, we use Av ∈ {0, 1}9 to
denote the sensitive attribute of node v, e.g., the age, gender, income etc. of a user in a social network.
The goal of an attacker A is to try to guess, or reconstruct, the sensitive attribute Av by looking at the
node representation X(K)v . Note that in this context, simply removing the sensitive attribute Av from
the input Xv is not sufficient, due to the potential redundant encoding problem in practice, i.e., other
attributes in Xv could be highly correlated with Av. Another potential technique for defense is through
homomorphic encryption of the learned representations X(K)v [Gentry and Boneh, 2009], so that the
encrypted data could be safely transmitted and used in downstream tasks. However, this often involves
expensive computation even in test phase, which limits its applications in mobile settings.
In this work we explore an alternative to the above approaches from an information-theoretic per-
spective. In particular, let FA := {f : RdK → {0, 1}} be the set of adversarial attackers that take the
last layer features from GNNs as input and output a guess of the sensitive attribute. Let D be a joint
distribution over the node input X , the sensitive attribute A, as well as the target variable Y . We define
the advantage [Goldwasser and Bellare, 1996] of adversarial attackers as
AdvD(FA) := sup
f∈FA
∣∣∣∣PrD (f(Z) = 1 | A = 1)− PrD (f(Z) = 1 | A = 0)
∣∣∣∣ , (3)
where Z is the random variable that denotes node features by applying a sequence of GNN layer
transformations to X . In the definition above, f could be understood as a particular attacker and
the supresum in (3) corresponds to finding the strongest (worst-case) attacker from a class FA. If
AdvD(FA) = 1, then there exists an attacker that by looking at the node features can almost surely guess
the sensitive attribute A. To this end, our goal here is to find representations Z such that AdvD(FA)
is small, which means that even the strongest attacker from FA cannot correctly guess the sensitive
attributes by looking at the representations Z. Throughout the paper we assume that FA is symmetric,
i.e., if f ∈ FA, then 1− f ∈ FA as well.
3 Algorithm and Analysis
In this section, we first relate the aforementioned advantage of the adversarial attackers to a natural
quantity that measures the ability of attackers in predicting the sensitive attribute A by looking at the
node features Z = X(K). Inspired by this relationship, we then proceed to introduce a minimax game
between the GNN feature encoder and the worst-case attacker, discuss the potential trade-off therein, and
analyze the effect of such defense.
9We assume binary sensitive attributes only for the ease of presentation. Extension to categorial variables is straightforward.
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Consider a symmetric set of attackers FA, then it is easy to see that 1 − AdvD(FA) essentially
corresponds to the sum of best Type-I and Type-II inference error any attacker from FA could hope to
achieve:
1− AdvD(FA) = inf
f∈FA
(
Pr
D
(f(Z) = 1 | A = 0) + Pr
D
(f(Z) = 0 | A = 1)
)
. (4)
Hence in order to minimize AdvD(FA), one natural strategy is to learn the parameters of the GNN so that
it filters out the sensitive information in the node input while still tries to preserve relevant information
w.r.t. the target task of inferring Y . Specifically, we can solve the following unconstrained optimization
problem with a trade-off parameter λ > 0:
min
h,g
max
f∈FA
εY (h ◦ g)− λ · εA(f ◦ g) (5)
Here we use εY (·) and εA(·) to denote the cross-entropy error on predicting Y and A respectively, and
g corresponds to the GNN feature encoder. Note that the above formulation is different from the usual
poisoning attacks on graphs [Zügner and Günnemann, 2019], where the goal is to learn a robust node
classifier under data poisoning. It is also worth pointing out that the optimization formulation in (5)
admits an interesting game-theoretic interpretation, where two agents f and g play a game whose score is
defined by the objective function in (5). Intuitively, f is the attacker and it seeks to minimize the sum
of Type-I and Type-II error while the GNN g plays against f by learning transformation to removing
information about the sensitive attribute A. Clearly, the hyperparameter λ controls the trade-off between
accuracy and defense. On one hand, if λ → 0, we barely care about the defense of A and devote all
the focus to minimize the predictive error. On the other extreme, if λ → ∞, we are only interested in
defending against the potential attacks.
Note that in this sequential game, the GNN g is the first-mover and the attacker f is the second. Hence
without explicit constraint g possesses a first-mover advantage so that GNN g can dominate the game by
simply mapping all the node input X to a constant or uniformly random noise. To avoid these degenerate
cases, the first term in the objective function of (5) acts as an incentive to encourage GNN to preserve
task-related information. But will this incentive compromise the information of A? As an extreme case if
the target variable Y and the sensitive attribute A are perfectly correlated, then it should be clear that
there is a trade-off in achieving accuracy and preventing information leakage of the attribute. In what
follows, we shall provide an analysis to characterize such an inherent trade-off.
3.1 Trade-off between Predictive Accuracy and Adversarial Advantage
As we briefly mentioned above, in general it is impossible to simultaneously achieve the goal of defense
and accuracy maximization. But what is the exact trade-off between accuracy and defense when they are
correlated? The following theorem characterizes a trade-off between the cross-entropy error of target
predictor and the advantage of the adversarial attackers:
Theorem 1. Let Z be the node features produced by a GNN g and FA be the set of all binary predictors.
Define δY |A := |PrD(Y = 1 | A = 0)− PrD(Y = 1 | A = 1)|. Then ∀h ∈ H,
εY |A=0(h ◦ g) + εY |A=1(h ◦ g) ≥ δY |A − AdvD(FA). (6)
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Remark First, εY |A=a(h ◦ g) denotes the conditional cross-entropy error of predicting Y given A =
a ∈ {0, 1}. Hence the above theorem says that, up to a certain threshold given by δY |A (which is a
constant), any target predictor based on the features given by GNN g has to incur a large error on at least
one of the sensitive groups. Furthermore, the smaller the adversarial advantage AdvD(FA), the larger the
error lower bound. Note that the lower bound in Theorem 1 is algorithm-independent, and considers the
strongest possible adversarial attacker, hence it reflects an inherent trade-off between error minimization
and defense to adversarial attacks. It is also worth pointing out that our result in Theorem 1 does not
depend on the marginal distribution of the sensitive attribute A. Instead, all the terms in our result only
depend on the conditional distributions given A = 0 and A = 1. This is often more desirable than bounds
involving mutual information, e.g., I(A, Y ), since I(A, Y ) is close to 0 if the marginal distribution of A
is highly imbalanced. As a corollary of Theorem 1, the overall error also admits a lower bound:
Corollary 2. Assume the conditions in Theorem 1 hold, then
εY (h ◦ g) ≥ min{PrD (A = 0),PrD (A = 1)} ·
(
δY |A − AdvD(FA)
)
.
The two lower bounds above capture the price we have to pay in terms of predictive accuracy in order
to minimize the adversarial advantage. Taking a closer look at the constant term δY |A that appears in the
lower bound, realize that
• If the target variable Y is statistically independent of the sensitive attribute A, then δY |A = 0,
hence the first term in the lower bound gracefully reduces to 0, meaning that there will be no loss
of accuracy even if we perfectly minimize the adversarial advantage.
• If the target variable Y is a bijective encoding of the sensitive attributeA, i.e., Y = A or Y = 1−A,
then δY |A = 1, hence the first term in the lower bound achieves the maximum value of 1, meaning
that in this case, if the adversarial advantage AdvD(FA)
)
= 0, then no matter what predictor h we
use, it has to incur a joint error of at least min{PrD(A = 0),PrD(A = 1)}. Note that this is the
error rate we achieve by using constant prediction.
3.2 Guarantees Against Adversarial Attacks
In this section we analyze the effect of such defense by solving (5) against worst-case attacker. The
analysis on the optimization of (5) in general non-convex-concave games using neural networks is still an
active area of research [Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018, Lin et al., 2019, Nouiehed et al., 2019] and hence
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, here we assume that we have access to the minimax stationary
point solution of (5), and focus on understanding how the solution of (5) affects the effectiveness of our
defense.
In what follows we analyze the true error that a worst-case adversary has to incur in the limit when
both the task classifier and the adversary have unlimited capacity, i.e., they can be any randomized
functions from Z to {0, 1}. To study the true error, we hence use the population loss rather than the
empirical loss in our objective function. Under such assumptions, it is easy to see that given any node
embedding Z from a GNN g, the worst-case adversary is the conditional distribution:
min
f∈FA
εA(f ◦ g) = H(A | Z), arg min
f∈FA
εA(f ◦ g) = Pr(A = 1 | Z).
6
By a symmetric argument, we can also see that minh∈H εY (h ◦ g) = H(Y | Z). Hence we can further
simplify the optimization formulation (5) to the following form where the only optimization variable is
the GNN node embedding g:
min
Z
H(Y | Z)− λ ·H(A | Z) (7)
We can now analyze the error that has to be incurred by the worst-case adversary:
Theorem 3. Let Z∗ be the optimal GNN node embedding of (7) and defineH∗ := H(A | Z∗). Then for
any adversary f : Z → {0, 1}, Pr(f(Z) 6= A) ≥ H∗/2 lg(6/H∗).
Theorem 3 shows that under this setting, whenever the conditional entropyH∗ = H(A | Z∗) is large,
then the inference error of the sensitive attribute incurred by any (randomized) adversary has to be at least
Ω(H∗/ log(1/H∗)). The conditional entropy could further be flexibly adjusted by tuning the trade-off
parameter λ. Furthermore, Theorem 3 also shows that GNN node embedding helps defense since we
always have H(A | Z) ≥ H(A | X) for any GNN features Z created from input X .
As a final note, recall that the representations Z appearing in the bounds above depend on the
graph structure (as evident from Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)), and the inference error in Theorem 3 is over the
representations Z (rather than the original input X), this means that the defense could potentially be
applied against neighborhood attacks, which we provide in-depth empirical explorations in Section 4.3.
4 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of GAL in defending attribute inference attacks on
graphs. Specifically, we would like to address the following questions related to GAL:
Ô 4.1: Can adversarial training protect against node-level attribute attacks across architectures and
data distributions?
Ô 4.2: What is the landscape of the tradeoff with respect to the hyperparameter λ?
Ô 4.3: Can our method provide sufficient remedy against additional leakage specific to neighborhood
aggregation schemes of graph neural networks?
To show that GAL is robust across architectures and data distributions, we tested out our model
on various tasks and GNN layers. We used 5 link-prediction benchmarks (Movielens-1M, FB15k-237,
WN18RR, CiteSeer, Pubmed) and 1 graph regression benchmark (QM9), which covers both defense of
single and multiple attributes. More importantly, the goal is not to challenge state-of-the-art training
schemes and models with our methods, but to observe its effect in reducing attackers’ accuracies while
maintaining performance of the original task. To address the quesitons, we correspondingly design three
experiments to validate our claims.
Robustness We ran our model on all six datasets under different settings, including encoder architecture,
random seed and defense strength. Then, we aggregate the results and report average performance over
five runs. The encoder we’ve tested are widely used in the literature [Defferrard et al., 2016, Gilmer et al.,
2017, Kipf and Welling, 2017, Vashishth et al., 2019, Velickovic et al., 2018, Xu et al., 2019b], and we
selected them according to their suitability to the task: e.g., CompGCN is designed for knowledge-graph-
related applications, etc.
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Table 1. Summary of benchmark dataset statistics, including number of nodes |V |, number of nodes
with sensitive attributes |S|, number of edges |E|, node-level non-sensitive features d, target task and
adversarial task, and whether the experiment concerns with multi-set defense.
DATASET |V | |S| |E| d Multi? METRICS: TASK ADVERSARY
CITESEER 3,327 3,327 4,552 3,703 7 AUC Macro-F1
PUBMED 19,717 19,717 44,324 500 7 AUC Macro-F1
QM9 2,383,055 2,383,055 2,461,144 13 7 MAE MAE
ML-1M 9,940 6,040 1,000,209 1 (id) 7 RMSE Macro-F1/AUC
FB15K-237 14,940 14,940 168,618 1 (id) 3 MRR/Hits@10 Macro-F1
WN18RR 40,943 40,943 173,670 1 (id) 7 MRR/Hits@10 Macro-F1
Tradeoff We compare performance under a wide range of λ values on the Movielens-1M dataset to
ascertain whether it can succesfully balance between task performance and defense strength. The hope is
that, under a selected range of values, we may limit the performance of attackers by a large margin while
only suffering minor losses to task performance.
Neighborhood For an extended analysis, we consider the scenario where the attacker only has access
to the embeddings of neighbors of a certain node, e.g. the attacker now tries to infer sensitive attribute
Av from X
(K)
w (instead of X
(K)
v ) such that a path exists between v and w in the original graph. Since we
hypothesized that neighborhood-aggregation modules may introduce such information leakage, attacks
shall achieve nontrivial performance. We then generalize this to an n-hop scenario based on the notion of
distances on graphs, and we introduce a fast Monte-Carlo algorithm to facilitate training. Compared to
our normal settings, we alter the adversarial part of the training process by randomly sampling n-distant
node pairs and calculate the loss between one node’s embedding and another’s sensitive attribute.
In all experiments, the attackers only have access to the training set labels along with embeddings from
the encoder, and after convergence the performance is measured on the held-out test set. A summary
of the datasets, including graph attributes, task, and adversary metrics, can be found in Table 1. A
more-detailed synthesis of the experimental setup can be found in the appendix.
Overall, our results have successfully addressed all three questions, demonstrating that our framework
is attractive for node-level attribute defense across downstream tasks, graph neural encoders, defense
strength, and attack scenarios.
4.1 Robust Node-level Attribute Defense
We first would like to demonstrate that adversarial training can be applied to a wide variety of GNN archi-
tectures and tasks. Quantitatively, we report task performances T1/2/3 as well as adversary performances
A1/2/3, both specific to respective datasets in Table 2. Note that fixed-embedding [Bose and Hamilton,
2019] results are only reported for Movielens-1M dataset since on other datasets, the experimental setups
are not suitable for comparison. Remark that when λ = 0, the adversary has no effect, so it works as a
baseline result. Across all datasets, we witness a significant drop in attacker’s performance with a rather
minor decrese in the main task performance.
From a qualitative perspective, the effect of adversarial training is also apparent: in Figure 2, we
visualized the t-SNE [van der Maaten and Hinton, 2008]-transformed representations of graph embeddings
under different regularization strengths on the Cora dataset. We observe that under a high regularization
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Table 2. Performance of predictions and defense on benchmark datasets. Best-performing GNNs and best
defense results are highlighted in bold. The “—“ mark stands for “same as above.“ We also implemented [Bose and
Hamilton, 2019]’s fixed embedding results and tested under the same setting, and, since the former work does not
allow tradeoff tuning, incompatible fields are marked with “N/A“.
Encoder Adversary λ1 λ2 λ3 T1 T2 T3 A1 A2 A3
ML-1M ChebConv Gender (F1) 0 0.5 10 0.852 0.880 1.338 0.693 0.594 0.501
Gender (AUC) — — — — — — 0.708 0.598 0.537
Age — — — — 0.871 1.337 0.289 0.145 0.100
Occupation — — — — 0.874 1.356 0.087 0.041 0.024
GCN Gender (F1) 0 0.5 10 0.931 0.999 1.256 0.699 0.584 0.436
Gender (AUC) — — — — — — 0.711 0.606 0.504
Age — — — — 0.999 1.211 0.238 0.186 0.074
Occupation — — — — 0.997 1.241 0.057 0.051 0.013
GAT Gender (F1) 0 0.5 10 0.903 0.976 1.205 0.669 0.504 0.441
Gender (AUC) — — — — — — 0.685 0.526 0.505
Age — — — — 0.966 1.195 0.219 0.104 0.075
Occupation — — — — 0.975 1.192 0.058 0.033 0.013
[Bose and Hamilton, 2019] Gender (F1) N/A N/A N/A 0.874 N/A N/A 0.667 N/A N/A
Gender (AUC) N/A N/A N/A — N/A N/A 0.678 N/A N/A
Age N/A N/A N/A — N/A N/A 0.188 N/A N/A
Occupation N/A N/A N/A — N/A N/A 0.051 N/A N/A
CITESEER GIN Doc. Class 0 1.25 1.75 0.815 0.731 0.726 0.450 0.318 0.292
GCN Doc. Class — — — 0.890 0.849 0.832 0.601 0.335 0.317
GAT Doc. Class — — — 0.889 0.865 0.853 0.604 0.509 0.406
ChebConv Doc. Class — — — 0.877 0.833 0.822 0.571 0.405 0.336
PUBMED GIN Doc. Class 0 1.15 1.25 0.817 0.782 0.799 0.720 0.403 0.474
GCN Doc. Class — — — 0.964 0.912 0.895 0.776 0.528 0.374
GAT Doc. Class — — — 0.930 0.862 0.780 0.768 0.680 0.536
ChebConv Doc. Class — — — 0.926 0.891 0.890 0.778 0.592 0.341
QM9 NNConv Polarizability 0 0.05 0.5 0.121 0.132 0.641 1.054 1.359 3.100
WN18RR CompGCN Word Sense 0 1.0 1.5 0.462/0.530 0.437/0.515 0.403/0.492 0.208 0.131 0.187
POS tag — — — — 0.430/0.510 0.395/0.490 0.822 0.607 0.705
FB15K-237 CompGCN Ent. Attr. 0 1.0 1.5 0.351/0.529 0.320/0.488 0.319/0.487 0.682 0.641 0.630
strength, node-level attributes are better mixed in the sense that nodes belonging to different classes are
harder to separate from each other on a graph-structural level.
4.2 Fine-grained Tradeoff Tuning with λ
We then show that λ is indeed a good tradeoff hyperparameter that balances between main task perfor-
mance and defense effectiveness. This is done through extensive experiments on a 3-layer ChebConv-
GNN and the Movielens-1M dataset, with λ values ranging from 0 to 103. From the reported results in
Figure 3, we observe that as λ increases, it is harder for the attacker to extract node-level information from
embeddings, while the main task performance also deteriorates steadily. In addition, when λ is larger
than 10, training destabilizes further due to inherent difficulties in optimization, which is shown through
the higher variance in task performance. This tradeoff is less visible for larger graphs like FB15k-237
and WN18RR, where due to difficulties in optimization, the effects of lambda tends to be less monotonic.
The results are reported in Table 2.
4.3 Neighborhood Attack and n-Hop Genrealization
Finally, we consider the scenario where the attacker seeks to extract node-level information from embed-
dings of neighbors. Though impossible from fixed-embedding or multi-layer-perceptron approaches, this
is a valid concern in graph neural networks where the message passing layers introduce neighborhood-
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= 0 = 1.3
Figure 2. GAL effectively protects sensitive information. t-SNE plots of computed feature representations of
graph under different defense strengths λ from a trained 2-layer GAT-GNN [Velickovic et al., 2018] on the Cora
dataset. Node colors represent node classes. Best viewed in color.
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Figure 3. Performance of node-level attribute defense on Movielens-1M dataset under different λ.
Band represents 95% confidence interval over five runs.
level information. In Figure 4, we verify that without any form of defense (λ = 0), the attacker indeed
achieves nontrivial performance by merely accessing the embeddings of neighbors on the Movielens-1M
dataset with a 2-layer ChebConv-GNN. We then ran comprehensive experiments, where the defense
now targets neighborhood-level embeddings, and observe the degradation of the attacker’s performance
(both on the node- and neighbor-level embeddings) as λ increases. The results demonstrate that under
low values of λ, the neighborhood-level defense has more effects on neighborhood attackers than node
attackers, meaning that node-level embeddings are less protected. However, as λ continues to increase,
the degradation in the performance of node attackers is more visible. An extension of this setup is to
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Figure 4. Performance of neighborhood-level attribute defense on a 3-layer ChebConv-GNN with Movielens-
1M dataset under different λ. Band represents 95% confidence interval over five runs.
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Movielens-1M dataset, with λ set to 0.8. Band represents 95% confidence interval over five runs.
consider neighborhood-level attacks as “single-hop“, where we can naturally define “n-hop“ as attackers
having accesses to only embeddings of nodes that are n-distant away from the target node:
AdvDHOP(n)(FA) := sup
f∈FA
∣∣∣∣ PrDHOP(n)(f(X(K)w ) = 1 | Av = 1)− PrDHOP(n)(f(X(K)w ) = 1 | Av = 0)
∣∣∣∣
subject to min
pi∈Paths(G,v,w)
|pi| = n
(8)
Since finding n-distant neighbors for arbitrary nodes in a large graph on-the-fly is computationally
inefficient during training (in the sense that the complexity bound involves |E| and |V |), we propose a
Monte-Carlo algorithm that probabilistically finds such neighbor in O(n2) time, the details of which
can be found in appendix. We report results under different “hops“ with the same encoder-λ setting
on Movielens-1M, shown in Figure 5. In general, we observe that as “hop“ increases, the retrieved
embedding contains less information about the target node. Therefore, adversarial training’s effect will
have less effect on the degradation of the target task, which is demonstrated by the steady decrease of
RMSE. The fluctuations in the trend of node- and neighborhood-level attackers are due to the probabilistic
nature of the Monte-Carlo algorithm used to sample neighbors, where it may end up finding a much
closer neighbor than intended, destabilizing the training process. This is another trade-off due to limited
training time, yet the general trend is still visible, certifying our assumptions.
5 Other Related Work
Graph Neural Networks GNNs have been successfully applied in a range of applications, e.g., rec-
ommender systems [Fan et al., 2019, Wang et al., 2019, Ying et al., 2018], drug discovery [Klicpera
et al., 2020, Liu et al., 2018, Sanchez-Lengeling and Aspuru-Guzik, 2018, Stokes et al., 2020], relational
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reasoning [Santoro et al., 2018, Saxton et al., 2019, Xu et al., 2020], and knowledge graphs Nickel et al.
[2015], Vashishth et al. [2019]. Effective engineering strategies such as big dataset [Hu et al., 2020] and
sampling [Zeng et al., 2019] have further promoted scaling of GNNs to large graphs in real business.
Theoretically, recent works study the expressive power for GNNs, and show that GNNs can be as
powerful as practical graph isomorphism tests [Chen et al., 2019, Xu et al., 2019b]. An exciting line of
works aim to design more powerful GNNs, e.g., by further incorporating graph properties in specific
applications [Barceló et al., 2019, Garg et al., 2020, Keriven and Peyré, 2019, Klicpera et al., 2020,
Loukas, 2019, Maron et al., 2018, 2019, Morris et al., 2019, Murphy et al., 2019, Oono and Suzuki, 2019,
Sato et al., 2019, Zhang et al., 2019]. Generalization of GNNs relies on the implicit biases of gradient
descent, due to GNN’s rich expressive power. Du et al. [2019] and Xu et al. [2020] study generalization
properties of GNNs. They analyze the gradient descent training dynamics of GNNs to characterize what
functions GNNs can sample-efficiently learn. Gama et al. [2019] investigate the good performance of
GNNs compared with linear graph filters, showing that GNNs can be both discriminative and stable.
Recent works also study GNNs from the kernel perspective [Chen et al., 2020, Du et al., 2019].
Our work builds upon both theoretical and application works of GNNs. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that characterizes the inherent tradeoffs between GNN predictive accuracy and
adversarial defense. Furthermore, we also give a lower bound on the inference error that any adversary has
to make, and we empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed adversarial defense approach
on both node attacks and neighborhood attacks.
Adversarial Attack on Graphs The main difference between our work and previous works in adver-
sarial attacks on graphs [Bojchevski and Günnemann, 2019, Chang et al., 2019, Dai et al., 2018, Ma et al.,
2019, Xu et al., 2019a] is the inherent difference in formulation. Prior works focus on perturbations of a
graph, e.g., by adding or removing edges, that maximize the loss of “victim” nodes for GNNs. In contrast,
attackers in our framework do not alter graph structure; instead, they seek to learn a parameterized
network that extracts critical information from the GNN embeddings.
Differential Privacy In this work we tackle a privacy problem where the adversary’s goal is to infer
some attribute of a node in a graph. One related but different notion of privacy is known as differential
privacy [Dwork et al., 2014], which aims at defending the so-called membership inference attack [Nasr
et al., 2018, Shokri et al., 2017]. Roughly speaking, here the goal is to design randomized algorithms so
that an adversary cannot guess whether an individual appears in the training data or not by looking at the
output of the algorithm. As a comparison, in this work we are concerned about attribute inference attacks,
and our goal is to find transformations of the data, so that the adversary cannot accurately infer a specific
attribute value of the data.
Intuitively, if we consider our data as a 2D matrix, where the first dimension corresponds to instances
and the second dimension corresponds to attributes, then differential privacy is about preserving privacy
about the the rows while ours aims to protect a specific column. On the other hand, similar to the
privacy-utility-data size tradeoff in differential privacy, in our case we also prove a tradeoff between
predictive accuracy and adversarial defense. Note that our tradeoff result is information-theoretic, so it
does not involve data size and applies to the population distribution and any algorithm acting upon the
learned representations.
Information Bottleneck Our work is also closely related to the information bottleneck method, which
seeks to simultaneously compress data while preserving enough information for target tasks [Alemi et al.,
2016, Tishby and Zaslavsky, 2015, Tishby et al., 2000]. Here we provide a brief discussion to contrast
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our method vs. the information bottleneck method. At a high level, the information bottleneck framework
could be understood as maximizing the following objective: I(Y ;Z) − βI(X;Z), where β > 0 is a
hyperparameter that tradeoffs the two terms. Specifically, there is no sensitive attribute A appearing
in the formulation. From an optimization perspective, the overall objective function of the information
bottleneck method could be equivalently framed as a minimization problem.
On the other hand, the minimax framework in this work is about a trade-off problem, i.e., finding Z
that balances between containing information about Y and A, respectively. In particular, the original
input X does not appear in our formulation: I(Y ;Z) − βI(A;Z). The final objective is a minimax
problem rather than a pure minimization problem. Overall, despite their surface similarity, our adversarial
defense method is significantly different from that of the information bottleneck method, in terms of both
optimization formulation and goals.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we address the problem of node-level attribute inference attacks on graph neural networks.
Our proposed framework, termed GAL, introduces a minimax game between the desired graph feature
encoder and the worst-case attacker. The resulting adversarial training creates a strong defense against
inference in terms of a provable lower bound on the error rate, while only suffering a marginal loss in
task performance. On the other hand, we also provide an information-theoretic result to characterize the
inherent tradeoff between accuracy and defense. Experiments on several benchmarking datasets have
shown that our method can readily complement existing algorithms deployed in downstream tasks to
address information security concerns on graph-structured data.
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Appendix
A Missing Proofs
In this section we provide the detailed proofs of both theorems in the main text. We first rigoriously
show the relationship between the adversarial advantage and the inference error made by a worst-case
adversarial:
Claim 4. 1− AdvD(FA) = inff∈FA (PrD(f(Z) = 1 | A = 0) + PrD(f(Z) = 0 | A = 1)).
Proof. Recall that FA is symmetric, hence ∀f ∈ FA, 1− f ∈ FA as well:
1− AdvD(FA) = 1− sup
f∈FA
∣∣∣∣PrD (f(Z) = 0 | A = 0)− PrD (f(Z) = 0 | A = 1)
∣∣∣∣
= 1− sup
f∈FA
(
Pr
D
(f(Z) = 0 | A = 0)− Pr
D
(f(Z) = 0 | A = 1)
)
= inf
f∈FA
(
Pr
D
(f(Z) = 1 | A = 0) + Pr
D
(f(Z) = 0 | A = 1)
)
,
where the second equality above is because
sup
f∈FA
(
Pr
D
(f(Z) = 0 | A = 0)− Pr
D
(f(Z) = 0 | A = 1)
)
is always non-negative due to the symmetric assumption of FA. 
Before we prove the lower bound in Theorem 1, we first need to introduce the following lemma,
which is known as the data-processing inequality of the TV distance.
Lemma 5 (Data-processing). Let D and D′ be two distributions over the same sample space and g
be a Markov kernel of the same space, then dTV(g]D, g]D′) ≤ dTV(D,D′), where g]D(g]D′) is the
pushforward of D(D′).
Theorem 1. Let Z be the node features produced by a GNN g and FA be the set of all binary predictors.
Define δY |A := |PrD(Y = 1 | A = 0)− PrD(Y = 1 | A = 1)|. Then ∀h ∈ H,
εY |A=0(h ◦ g) + εY |A=1(h ◦ g) ≥ δY |A − AdvD(FA). (6)
Proof. Let g]D be the induced (pushforward) distribution of D under the GNN feature encoder g. To
simplify the notation, we also use D0 and D1 to denote the conditional distribution of D given A = 0 and
A = 1, respectively. Since h : Z → {0, 1} is the task predictor, it follows that (h ◦ g)]D0 and (h ◦ g)]D1
induce two distributions over {0, 1}. Recall that dTV(·, ·) is a distance metric over the space of probability
distributions, by a chain of triangle inequalities, we have:
dTV(D(Y | A = 0),D(Y | A = 1)) ≤ dTV(D(Y | A = 0), (h ◦ g)]D0)
+ dTV((h ◦ g)]D0, (h ◦ g)]D1) + dTV((h ◦ g)]D1,D(Y | A = 1)).
Now by Lemma 5, we have
dTV((h ◦ g)]D0, (h ◦ g)]D1) ≤ dTV(g]D0, g]D1).
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On the other hand, since FA contains all the binary predictors:
dTV(g]D0, g]D1) = sup
E is measurable
∣∣∣∣ Prg]D0(E)− Prg]D1(E)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
fE∈FA
∣∣∣∣ Prg]D0(fE(Z) = 1)− Prg]D1(fE(Z) = 1)
∣∣∣∣
= sup
fE∈FA
∣∣∣∣Prg]D(fE(Z) = 1 | A = 0)− Prg]D(fE(Z) = 1 | A = 1)
∣∣∣∣
= AdvD(FA),
where in the second equation above fE(·) is the characteristic function of the event E. Now combine the
above two inequalities together, we have:
dTV(D(Y | A = 0),D(Y | A = 1))− AdvD(FA) ≤ dTV(D(Y | A = 0), (h ◦ g)]D0)
+ dTV(D(Y | A = 1), (h ◦ g)]D1).
Next we bound dTV(D(Y | A = a), (h ◦ g)]Da), ∀a ∈ {0, 1}:
dTV(D(Y | A = a), (h ◦ g)]Da)
=
1
2
‖D(Y | A = a)− (h ◦ g)]Da‖1
= |Pr
D
(Y = 1 | A = a)− Pr
D
((h ◦ g)(X) = 1 | A = a)| (Both Y and h(g(X)) are binary)
= |ED[Y | A = a]− ED[(h ◦ g)(X) | A = a]|
≤ ED[|Y − (h ◦ g)(X)| | A = a] (Triangle inequality)
= Pr
D
(Y 6= (h ◦ g)(X) | A = a)
≤ εY |A=a(h ◦ g),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that the cross-entropy loss is an upper bound of the 0-1
binary loss. To complete the proof, realize that for binary prediction problems, the total variation term
dTV(D(Y | A = 0),D(Y | A = 1)) admits the following simplification:
dTV(D(Y | A = 0),D(Y | A = 1))
=
1
2
(|Pr(Y = 1 | A = 0)− Pr(Y = 1 | A = 1)|+ |Pr(Y = 0 | A = 0)− Pr(Y = 0 | A = 1)|)
= |Pr(Y = 1 | A = 0)− Pr(Y = 1 | A = 1)|
= δY |A.
This gives us:
δY |A − AdvD(FA) ≤ εY |A=0(h ◦ g) + εY |A=1(h ◦ g). (9)

Corollary 2 then follows directly from Theorem 1:
Corollary 2. Assume the conditions in Theorem 1 hold, then
εY (h ◦ g) ≥ min{PrD (A = 0),PrD (A = 1)} ·
(
δY |A − AdvD(FA)
)
.
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Proof. Realize that
εY (h ◦ g) = PrD (A = 0) · εY |A=0(h ◦ g) + PrD (A = 1) · εY |A=1(h ◦ g)
≥ min{Pr
D
(A = 0),Pr
D
(A = 1)} · (εY |A=0(h ◦ g) + εY |A=1(h ◦ g)) .
Applying the lower bound in Theorem 1 then completes the proof. 
The following lemma about the inverse binary entropy will be useful in the proof of Theorem 3:
Lemma 6 (Calabro [2009]). Let H−12 (s) be the inverse binary entropy function for s ∈ [0, 1], then
H−12 (s) ≥ s/2 lg(6/s).
With the above lemma, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Let Z∗ be the optimal GNN node embedding of (7) and defineH∗ := H(A | Z∗). Then for
any adversary f : Z → {0, 1}, Pr(f(Z) 6= A) ≥ H∗/2 lg(6/H∗).
Proof. To ease the presentation we define Z = Z∗. To prove this theorem, let E be the binary random
variable that takes value 1 iff A 6= f(Z), i.e., E = I(A 6= f(Z)). Now consider the joint entropy of
A, f(Z) and E. On one hand, we have:
H(A, f(Z), E) = H(A, f(Z)) +H(E | A, f(Z)) = H(A, f(Z)) + 0 = H(A | f(Z)) +H(f(Z)).
Note that the second equation holds because E is a deterministic function of A and f(Z), that is, once
A and f(Z) are known, E is also known, hence H(E | A, f(Z)) = 0. On the other hand, we can also
decompose H(A, f(Z), E) as follows:
H(A, f(Z), E) = H(E) +H(A | E) +H(f(Z) | A,E).
Combining the above two equalities yields
H(E,A | f(Z)) = H(A | f(Z)).
On the other hand, we can also decompose H(E,A | f(Z)) as
H(E,A | f(Z)) = H(E | f(Z)) +H(A | E, f(Z)).
Furthermore, since conditioning cannot increase entropy, we have H(E | f(Z)) ≤ H(E), which further
implies
H(A | f(Z)) ≤ H(E) +H(A | E, f(Z)).
Now consider H(A | E, f(Z)). Since A ∈ {0, 1}, by definition of the conditional entropy, we have:
H(A | E, f(Z)) = Pr(E = 1)H(A | E = 1, f(Z)) + Pr(E = 0)H(A | E = 0, f(Z)) = 0 + 0 = 0.
To lower bound H(A | f(Z)), realize that
I(A; f(Z)) +H(A | f(Z)) = H(A) = I(A;Z) +H(A | Z).
Since f(Z) is a randomized function of Z such that A ⊥ f(Z) | Z, due to the celebrated data-processing
inequality, we have I(A; f(Z)) ≤ I(A;Z), which implies
H(A | f(Z)) ≥ H(A | Z).
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Combine everything above, we have the following chain of inequalities hold:
H(A | Z) ≤ H(A | f(Z)) ≤ H(E) +H(A | E, f(Z)) = H(E),
which implies
Pr(A 6= f(Z)) = Pr(E = 1) ≥ H−12 (H(A | Z)),
where H−12 (·) denotes the inverse function of the binary entropy H(t) := −t log t− (1− t) log(1− t)
when t ∈ [0, 1]. To conclude the proof, we apply Lemma 6 to further lower bound the inverse binary
entropy function by
Pr(A 6= f(Z)) ≥ H−12 (H(A | Z)) ≥ H(A | Z)/2 lg(6/H(A | Z)),
completing the proof. 
B Experimental Setup Details
Optimization For the objective function, we selected block gradient descent-ascent to optimize our
models. In particular, we took advantage of the optim module in PyTorch Paszke et al. [2019] by
designing a custom gradient-reversal layer, first introduced by Ganin et al. [2016], to be placed between
the attacker and the GNN layer we seek to defend. The implementation of the graident-reversal layer can
be found in the Appendix. During training, we would designate two Optimizer instances, one having
access to only task-related parameters, and the other having access to attack-related parameters and
parameters associated with GNN defense. We could then call the .step() method on the optimizers in an
alternating fashion to train the entire network, where the gradient-reversal layer would carry out both
gradient descent (of the attacker) and ascent (of protected layers) as expected. Tradeoff control via λ is
achieved through multiplying the initial learning rate of the adversarial learner by the desired factor. For
graphs that are harder to optimize, we introduce pre-training as the first step in the pipeline, where we
train the encoder and the task decoder for a few epochs before introducing the adversarial learner.
Movielens 1M The main dataset of interest for this work is Movielens-1M 10, a benchmarking dataset
in evaluating recommender systems, developed by Harper and Konstan [2015]. In this dataset, nodes are
either users or movies, and the type of edge represents the rating the user assigns to a movie. Adapting the
formulation of Bose and Hamilton [2019], we designate the main task as edge prediction and designate
the adversarial task as extracting user-related information from the GNN embedding using multi-layer
perceptrons with LeakyReLU functions Maas [2013] as nonlinearities. Training/test splits are creating
using a random 90/10 shuffle. The network encoder consists of a trainable embedding layer followed by
neighborhood aggregation layers. Node-level embeddings have a dimension of 20, and the decoder is a
naive bilinear decoder, introduced in Berg et al. [2017]. Both the adversarial trainers and the main task
predictors are trained with separate Adam optimizers with learning rate set to 0.01. Worst-case attackers
are trained for 30 epochs with a batch-size 256 nodes before the original model is trained for 25 epochs
with a batch-size of 8,192 edges.
10https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/1m/
23
Planetoid Planetoid 11 is the common name for three datasets (Cora, CiteSeer, Pubmed) used in
benchmarks of graph neural networks in the literature, introduced by Yang et al. [2016]. Nodes in these
datasets represent academic publications, and edges represent citation links. Since the Cora dataset is
considered to be small to have any practical implications in the performance of our algorithm, we report
only the results of CiteSeer and Pubmed. Similar to Movielens, the main task is edge prediction, and the
attacker will seek to predict node attributes from GNN-processed embeddings. The network architecture
is message-passing layers connected with ReLU nonlinearities, and both the decoder and attacker are
also single-layer message-passing modules. Regarding training/valid/test splits, we adopt the default
split used in the original paper, maintained by Fey and Lenssen [2019]. The network encoder consists
of a trainable embedding layer followed by neighborhood aggregation layers. Node-level embeddings
have a dimension of 64, and both the adversarial trainers and the main task predictors are trained with
separate Adam optimizers with learning rate set to 0.01. Worst-case attackers are trained for 80 epochs
with before the original model is trained for 150 epochs, and the entire graph is fed into the network at
once during each epoch.
QM9 QM9 12 is a dataset used to benchmark machine learning algorithms in quantum chemistry Wu
et al. [2017], consisting of around 130,000 molecules (represented in their spatial information of all
component atoms) and 19 regression targets. The main task would be to predict the dipole moment
µ for a molecule graph, while the attacker will seek to extract its isotropic polarizability α from the
embeddings. The encoder is a recurrent architecture consisting of a NNConv Gilmer et al. [2017] unit,
a GRU Cho et al. [2014] unit and a Set2Set Vinyals et al. [2015] unit, with both the decoder and the
attacker (as regressors) 2-layer multi-layer perceptrons with ReLU nonlinearities. The training/valid/test
is selected in the following manner: the order of samples is randomly shuffled at first, then the first
10,000 and 10,000 - 20,000 samples are selected for testing and validation respectively, and the remaining
samples are used for training. Preprocessing is done with scripts provided by Fey and Lenssen [2019] 13 ,
using functions from Landrum. Node-level embeddings have a dimension of 64, and both the adversarial
trainers and the main task predictors are trained with separate Adam optimizers with learning rate set
to 0.001. Worst-case attackers are trained for 30 epochs with before the original model is trained for 40
epochs with a batch-size of 128 molecular graphs.
FB15k-237/WN18RR These two datasets are benchmarks for knowledge base completion: while
FB15k-237 14 is semi-synthetic with nodes as common entities, WN18RR 15 is made by words found in
the thesaurus. Our formulation is as follows: while the main task from both datasets is edge prediction,
the attackers’ goals are different:
• For FB15k-237, we took node-level attributes from Moon et al. [2017] 16, and task the attacker
with predicting the 50-most frequent labels. Since a node in FB15k-237 may have multiple labels
11Raw data available at https://github.com/kimiyoung/planetoid/tree/master/data. For this work,
we used the wrapper provided by https://pytorch-geometric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/_modules/
torch_geometric/datasets/planetoid.html.
12Raw data available at https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/deepchem.io/datasets/molnet_
publish/qm9.zip and https://ndownloader.figshare.com/files/3195404
13Available at https://pytorch-geometric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/_modules/torch_
geometric/datasets/qm9.html
14https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=52312
15https://github.com/TimDettmers/ConvE
16https://github.com/cmoon2/knowledge_graph
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associated with it, adversarial defense on this may be seen as protecting sets of node-level attributes,
in contrast to single-attribute defense in other experimental settings.
• For WN18RR, we consider two attributes for a node (as a word): its word sense (sense greater than
20 are considered as the same heterogeneous class), and part-of-speech tag. The labels are obtained
from Bordes et al. [2013] 17.
As for the architecture, we used a modified version of the CompGCN paper Vashishth et al. [2019],
where the attacker has access to the output of the CompGCN layer (of dimension 200), and the original
task utilizes the ConvE model for the decoder. The training/valid/test split also aligns with the one used
in the CompGCN paper. On both datasets, the adversarial trainers and main task predictors are trained
with separate Adam optimizers with learning rate set to 0.001. Worst-case attackers are trained for 30
epochs with a batch-size of 128 nodes before the original model is trained for 120 epochs after 35 epochs
of pre-training, with a batch-size of 128 nodes.
Computing Infrastructure All models are trained with NVIDIA GeForce® RTX 2080 Ti graphics
processing units (GPU) with 11.0 GB GDDR6 memory on each card, and non-training-related operations
are performed using Intel® Xeon® Processor E5-2670 (20M Cache, 2.60 GHz).
Estimated Average Runtime Below are the averge training time per epoch for each models used in
the main text, when the training is performed on the computing infrastructure mentioned above:
DATASET Encoder t
CITESEER ChebConv 0.0232s
GCN 0.0149s
GAT 0.0282s
PUBMED ChebConv 0.0920s
GCN 0.0824s
GAT 0.129s
QM9 NNConv 199.25s
MOVIELENS-1M ChebConv 16.89s
GCN 12.05s
GAT 45.86s
FB15K-237 CompGCN 463.39s
WN18RR CompGCN 181.55s
17https://everest.hds.utc.fr/doku.php?id=en:smemlj12
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C Degredation of RMSE on Movielens-1M dataset Regarding Neighbor-
hood Attack
This is a supplementary figure for the neighborhood attack experiments introduced in the main section.
Band represents 95% confidence interval over five runs.
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D N-Hop Algorithm for Neighborhood Defense
Intuitively, this algorithm greedily constructs a path of length n by uniformly picking a neighbor from the
current end of the path and checking if the node has existed previously in the path, avoiding formation of
cycles. Worst-case running time of this algorithm is O(n2), because in each step of the main loop, the
algorithm performs O(n) checks in the worst case scenario.
Algorithm 1Monte-Carlo Probabilistic N-Hop
Input: G = (V,E): undirected graph (via adjacency list); v ∈ V : starting node; n ≥ 1: hop
Output: On success: v′ ∈ V such that d(v, v′) = n or NO if such vertex doesn’t exist; On failure:
v′ ∈ V such that 1 ≤ d(v, v′) ≤ n or NO if such vertex doesn’t exist
1: procedure NHOP(G, v, n) . Time complexity is O(n2)
2: V ← ∅ . Initial path is empty
3: t← 0
4: v′ = v
5: while t < n do
6: S ← [N (v′)] . O(1) time by adjacency list
7: i← RandInt(0, |S|) . O(1) uniform random sample (without replacement)
8: e← S.pop(i)
9: while e ∈ V and S 6= [] do . Loop runs at most O(n) times
10: i← RandInt(0, |S|)
11: e← S.pop(i)
12: if e /∈ V then
13: V ← V ∩ {e}
14: v′ = e
15: else . Current path not satisfiable, reject
16: reject with NO
17: t← t+ 1
18: accept with v′
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